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VENUE IN JUVENILE COURTS
The juvenile courts, first established in 1899,1 are based upon the con-
cept that the state is "parens patriae"2 to the children within its bound-
aries. Their proceedings were initially denominated as "civil," since
the task of the juvenile court was to integrate the needs of the child
with the policy of providing protection to society against anti-social con-
duct, rather than merely effectuating that social policy through criminal
responsibility and punishment.- The constitutional safeguards sur-
rounding a criminal proceeding were deemed inapposite to the juvenile
procedures because of the civil nature and the rehabilitative focus of
the juvenile court system.4 Partly because the ideals underlying the
juvenile system were unfulfilled, the Supreme Court has held that cer-
tain procedural safeguards are constitutionally required at the juvenile
1. The first juvenile court was opened on July 1, 1899, in Chicago, Illinois, with
Judge R. S. Tuthill presiding. For history of the juvenile court system, see Glueck,
Some "Unfinished Business" in the Management of Juvenile Delinquency, 15 SYRACUSE
L. Rtv. 628 n.2 (1964); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909).
2. The parens patriae concept was developed in England, where the chancery
court exercised protective jurisdiction over all children of the realm on behalf of the
pater patriae, the King. In the United States, the individual state was substituted for
the King and was said to possess an interest in the welfare of every child within its
boundaries and possessed the power to exercise this interest through the juvenile courts.
See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIIME 2 (1967);
Note, Due Process and the Juvenile Offender: The Scope of In re Gault, 14 How. L.J.
150 (1968).
3. See Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909). Early cases
enunciated this view of the juvenile court. In Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. St.
48, 53, 62 A. 198, 200 (1905), the court stated:
To save a child from becoming a criminal, or from continuing in a career of
crime, to end in maturer years in public punishment and disgrace, the legis-
lature surely may provide for the salvation of such a child, if its parents or
guardian be unable or unwilling to do so, by bringing it into one of the courts
of the state without any process at all, for the purpose of subjecting it to the
state's guardianship and protection.
The Supreme Court of Idaho in the case of In re Sharpe, 15 Idaho 120, 127, 96 P.
563, 564 (1908), stated the object of the juvenile court in this manner:
Its object is to confer a benefit both upon the child and the community in
the way of surrounding the child with better and more elevating influences
and of education and training him in the direction of good citizenship, and
thereby saving him to society and adding a good and useful citizen to the com-
munity.
See Trumbull, Proposed New Juvenile Court Act for Illinois, 53 ILL. B.J. 608 (1967).
4. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-21 (1967).
407
Washington University Open Scholarship
408 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1973:407
court adjudication stage.5 One issue that the Supreme Court has not
directly confronted, however, is that of venue' in juvenile court pro-
ceedings.
This note will examine venue in the juvenile justice system, analyze
the relevant state statutes and case law, report on the findings of an
empirical study conducted by the Law Quarterly,7 and discuss possible
constitutional bases for venue as a constitutional right.
I. THE LAW OF JUVENILE VENUE
In the juvenile justice system, the issue of venue arises only when
a juvenile resides, commits an act, or is apprehended in different juris-
dictions. Since there are few reported cases," the statutes of the indi-
vidual states must be examined9 to ascertain the state of the law.
State statutes vary in approach to the designation of juvenile court
venue. The juvenile court acts of nineteen states contain express venue
5. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (the standard of proof at the adjudication
phase of the juvenile court proceedings must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt);
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (in the adjudication phase of a delinquency proceeding
which could result in a deprivation of liberty the child is entitled to certain procedural
rights---notice of the charges, right to retained or appointed counsel, right to confronta-
tion and cross-examination of witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination).
See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (waiver hearing must measure up to
the essentials of due process and fair treatment). But cf. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528 (1971) (a juvenile within the juvenile justice system is not entitled to
a trial by jury, since this would contravene the avowed objectives of that system).
6. Venue is a term used to describe the appropriate court within a jurisdiction
in which an action may be brought. See Morgan, Criminal Venue and Related Prob-
lems, 2 GA. ST. B.J. 331 (Feb. 1966); Williams, Venue and the Ambit of Criminal
Law, 81 L.Q. Rnv. 276 (1965); cf. Miller, Constitutional Limitations on the Power of
the Missouri Legislature to Provide for Venue In Criminal Cases, 1958 WASH. U.L.Q.
35.
7. The empirical findings represent the results of a questionnaire sent to 500
juvenile court judges throughout the country selected in proportion to population. The
returned questionnaires are now on file in the James Carr Collection of the Washington
University School of Law Library. The Law Quarterly extends its appreciation to
Professor Frank W. Miller for his assistance and Miss Kathy Dumont for her guidance
in the empirical study.
8. A possible reason for the sparsity of cases raising venue issues is that, until
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), attorneys were not required at juvenile adjudication
hearings. Therefore, it was unlikely that procedural issues such as venue would be
raised.
9. In addition to an examination of the various state statutes, the Law Quarterly
surveyed judges of various juvenile courts. The responses to the questionnaire sent to
the judges are primarily discussed infra at notes 56-83.
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provisions."' Sixteen states in effect create venue provisions by limit-
ing juvenile court jurisdiction to a particular county or counties," while
eight states create venue by limiting the court in which a petition may
be filed.1 Seven states provide that the juvenile court has original and
exclusive statewide jurisdiction. 3
There are five conceivable alternatives for juvenile court venue: (1)
where the petition is filed; (2) where the child is found; (3) where the
act was committed; (4) where the child resides; and (5) where the
parent, but not necessarily the child, resides. Five states make the
broadest selection among these alternatives and allow venue wherever
the petition is filed.' 4  The statutes of eleven states permit three alterna-
10. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-206 (Supp. 1972); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE
§ 651 (Deering 1969); COLO. REX,. STAT. ANN. § 22-8-3 (1964); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 24A-1101 (1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 232.68 (1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-811 (1964); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 4, § 155 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-4 (Supp. 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 260.121 (1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:3 (1955); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 717
(McKinney Supp. 1972); ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.480 (1971); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 37-211 (Supp. 1972); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 7-A (1971); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 55-10-85 (Supp. 1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 637 (Supp. 1972); VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-160 (1960); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.16 (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-115.5
(Supp. 1971).
11, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 951 (Supp. 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02 (Supp.
1972); HAWAI REV. STAT. § 571-11 (1968); IDAHO CODE § 16-1803 (Supp. 1972);
KY. REV. STAT. § 208.020 (1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1570 (1968); Micir.
STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (598.2) (Supp. 1972); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7185-03 (Supp. 1972);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.031 (1969); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.040 (1971); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-8-26 (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-279 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-08
(1960); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1102 (Supp. 1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1171 (Supp.
1971).
12. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 352 (1959); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-210 (1964); CONN.
GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-70 (Supp. 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3208 (1956); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 43-205 (1968); OmIo REV. CODE § 2151.27 (Supp. 1972); S.D. CoMP. .Aws
ANN. § 26-8-10 (Supp. 1972); WASH. RE. CODE ANN. § 13.04.060 (1962).
13. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.290 (Supp. 1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. oh. 119, § 24
(Supp. 1972); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 10-603 (1968); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:4-14
(1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 244 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 14-1-3(B), 14-
1-5 (1970); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-1 (1966). Hereinafter, there will be no formal
distinction made between express venue provisions, see note 10 supra, jurisdictional
grants, see note 11 supra, filing of the petition, see note 12 supra, and statewide jurisdic-
tion, see note 13. All of these classifications will be treated as one type of venue
provision.
14. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-210 (1964); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 10-603 (1968);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-205 (1968); S.D. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 26-8-10 (Supp. 1972);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-1 (1966). The petition in these states must allege juvenile
court jurisdiction expressly as well as the improper conduct. The Law Quarterly re-
ceived four responses to its questionnaire from three of these states-Montana, Ne-
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tives-where the child is found, where the act occurred, or where the child
resides. 15 Twenty-five states provide two alternatives for venue: seven-
teen of these states set venue either where the child is found or where the
child resides, 6 while eight states lay venue where the act occurred or
where the child resides. 17 No state provides as an alternative venue
where the child is found or where the act occurred. Four states limit
braska, and South Dakota. All the judges concurred that venue could be laid in their
court if the juvenile resided, committed an act or was apprehended in their jurisdic-
tion.
15. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 651 (Deering 1969); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-8-3 (1964); HAWAI REV. STAT. § 571-11 (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-6
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.68 (1969); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-811 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. § 208.020 (1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.121
(1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-85 (Supp. 1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.16 (1957);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-115.5 (Supp. 1971). The Law Quarterly received responses
from judges in seven of these states. The judges from California, Hawaii, Illinois, and
Iowa interpreted their statute to allow for all three alternatives. The judges in Colo-
rado, Minnesota, and Wisconsin seem to interpret their statute in a more limited fashion,
restricting venue to where the juvenile resides or where he commits an anti-social act.
16. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 352 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010 (Supp. 1971);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 951 (Supp. 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02 (Supp. 1972);
IDAHo CODE § 16-1803 (Supp. 1972); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3208 (1956); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-811 (1964); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:1570 (1968); MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 7185-03 (Supp. 1972); NEv. REV. STAT. § 62.040 (1971); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 169:3 (1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-26 (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-279
(1969); N.D. CENT. CODE' § 27-16-08 (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.480 (1971);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 14-1-5 (1970); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.04.060 (1962).
Judges from nine of these states responded to the Law Quarterly questionnaire. All
the judges except those from New Hampshire stated that residence venue was allowed.
All the judges indicated jurisdiction could be assumed if the juvenile committed an anti-
social act in the judge's jurisdiction. It appears, therefore, that jurisdiction in several
of these states is extended beyond the statutory provision.
The phrase "within the county" was interpreted by In re Gibson, 4 Wash. App. 372,
483 P.2d 131 (1971), to contemplate physical presence of the child in the county
where the petition is filed. The court stated that the child may be considered within
the county of a particular court even though the child who has been living in that
county spends brief periods of time in another county.
17. ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-206 (Supp. 1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. RVv. § 17-70
(Supp. 1969); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-1101 (Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-4
(Supp. 1971); Omo REV. CODE § 2151.27 (Supp. 1972); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-211
(Supp. 1972); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 7-A (1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33,
§ 637 (Supp. 1972).
Judges from Connecticut, Ohio, Tennessee, and Texas responded. The Tennessee
judges indicated that venue was proper where the petition was filed or when the juvenile
was apprehended in their jurisdiction. Conversely, Texas judges limited the scope of
their statute by assuming jurisdiction only when the juvenile committed an anti-social act
in their jurisdiction.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss2/4
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venue to only one location:' 8 Missouri and Michigan'9 provide for
venue only where the child is found;20 Maine and New York allow
venue only where the act was committed. 21
Approaching statutory venue from' another perspective, twenty-three
states do not expressly provide for venue where the act occurred;
22
18. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 155 (1964); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (598.2)
(Supp. 1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.031 (1969); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT. § 717 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1972).
19. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (598.2) (Supp. 1972); Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.031
(1969).
20. The provisions providing for venue "where the child is found" have been inter-
preted to mean "physically present." See In re Mathers, 371 Mich. 516, 124 N.W.2d
878, motion for reh. denied, 371 Mich. 516, 126 N.W.2d 722 (1963); In re Shaw,
449 S.W.2d 380 (Mo. 1969). The Michigan Court held that "found" meant "physically
present in the county" and that according to the statute, juvenile court jurisdiction is
not based upon the residence of the juvenile. The court in Smith v. Davis, 147 So.
2d 177, 179 (Fla. App. 1962), held that the juvenile court has no jurisdiction to ad-
judicate the custody of a minor unless the child is physically present within the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the court at the time the suit is filed.
In dependency and neglect proceedings different rules seem to apply. A Missouri
court in State v. Farrell, 237 S.W.2d 492, 495 (Mo. App. 1951), held that the juvenile
court had authority to adjudge a seven year old child neglected when the child
was within the jurisdiction when the action was instituted. An Illinois court in the
case of In re Bartha, 87 Ill. App. 2d 263, 266, 230 N.E.2d 886, 887-88 (1967), held
that the circuit court had jurisdiction to entertain dependency proceedings although the
child had been within its jurisdiction for only one day.
The Law Quarterly received responses from judges of both states, from which it was
evident that the concept of physical presence allows considerable latitude. Missouri
judges permit venue to be placed in their court if the juvenile was apprehended, resided,
or committed an anti-social act within their jurisdiction. See text accompanying notes
45-47 infra. Michigan judges indicated that venue was proper if the juvenile was ap-
prehended or resided within their jurisdiction, or the petition was filed there.
21. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 155 (1964); N.Y. FAMILY Cr. AcT § 717 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1972). Seven judges from New York responded to the Law Quarterly
questionnaire. Four interpreted the statute to allow venue when the juvenile resided
in their jurisdiction. All seven would assume jurisdiction if the juvenile committed an
anti-social act in their jurisdiction. The one response received from Maine indicated
that the judge would assume jurisdiction when the child was apprehended in his juris.
diction.
22. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 352 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010 (1962); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 45-210 (1964); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 951 (Supp. 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 39.02 (Supp. 1972); IDAHO CODE § 16-1803 (Supp. 1972); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3208
(Supp. 1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1570 (1968); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 267.3178
(598.2) (Supp. 1972); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7185-03 (Supp. 1972); Mo. REV. STAT. §
211.031 (1969); NEa. REV. STAT. § 43-205 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.040 (1968);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:3 (1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-26 (1968); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-279 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-08 (1960); OKLA. STAT. tit. 20,
§ 1102 (Supp. 1972); ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.480 (1971); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 14-
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eleven states do not permit venue where the child is found;28 and four
states do not provide for venue where the child resides.2 4  No state
restricts venue exclusively to the child's residence.25
The statutes of only twenty-four states contain change of venue pro-
visions.26  Thirteen states limit the change of venue to the juvenile's
1-5 (1970); S.D. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 26-8-10 (Supp. 1972); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 13.04.060 (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-7 (1966).
23. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-206 (Supp. 1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-70
(Supp. 1969); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-1101 (1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 155
(1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-4 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. FAMILY Or. AcT § 717
(McKinney Supp. 1972); Omo REV. CODE § 2151.27 (Supp. 1972); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 37-211 (Supp. 1972); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 7-A (1971); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit 33, § 637 (Supp. 1972).
24. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 155 (1964); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178
(598.2) (Supp. 1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.031 (1969); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 717
(McKinney Supp. 1972).
25. But a comparison of model juvenile court acts demonstrates a trend away from
the general "where the child is found" and "where the petition is filed" provisions. The
Uniform Juvenile Court Act provides for venue "where the act occurred" and "where
the child resides." UNIFoRm JUVENILE COURT ACT § 11 (1968). The earlier Standard
Juvenile Court Act had allowed the additional alternative "where the child is found."
STANDARD JUVENILE COURT ACT § 8 (1959). This trend is supported by the states that
have revised or adopted new juvenile court acts since 1967: only one state, Oklahoma,
out of at least fourteen states has included the "where the child is found" provision. See
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1102 (Supp. 1972).
26. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 365 (1959); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 750 (Deering
1969); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-5 (1964); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-70
(Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02 (Supp. 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-1201
(1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 232.69 (1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-812 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. § 208.020 (1971);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1570 (1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 155 (1964);
MD. CODE ANN. art. 26, § 70-5 (Supp. 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.121 (1971);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169:3 (1955); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 717 (MeKinney Supp.
1972); Omo REv. CODE § 2151.27 (Supp. 1972); ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.545 & 419.547
(1971); S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 26-7-1.1 (Supp. 1972); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-212
(Supp. 1972); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-85 (Supp. 1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 636
(Supp. 1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-160 (1960); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-115.5 (Supp.
1971).
The remaining twenty-six states do not expressly provide for a change of venue.
Two possible reasons exist for this phenomenon. If a state's initial venue provisions are
broad enough, or if changes are made by informal agreement, formal change of venue
statutory provisions may be unnecessary. This is supported by the responses Law
Quarterly received from judges in Delaware, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin, who indi-
cated a change of venue would occur to the court of the juvenile's residence and (ex-
cept in Montana) to the place where a serious act was committed. The authorization
for such change of venue may be in juvenile court rules of which the Law Quarterly is
unaware, or these changes of venue may occur without explicit statutory authority.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss2/4
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residence.2 7  Kentucky and Minnesota provide for a change of venue
to either where the juvenile resides or where the act was committed.28
Iowa permits a change of venue to any other place where the action
could have been brought."'  Finally, Alabama, New York, and New
Hampshire permit a change of venue to any other county in the state,3
In the states that explicitly provide for a change of venue,31 the stat-
utes of ten states make no reference to the time when a change of venue
is to be made? 2 The statutes of eight states provide only that a change
of venue may occur at any time during the proceedings." Three
27. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 750 (Deering 1969); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-1-5 (1964); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02 (Supp. 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-1201
(1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 26, § 70-5 (Supp. 1971); Omo REV. CODE § 2151.271 (Supp. 1972); ORE. REV.
STAT. §§ 419.545 & 419.547 (1972); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 26-7-1.1 (Supp. 1972);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-212 (Supp. 1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-85 (Supp. 1971);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 636 (Supp. 1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-160 (1960).
The Law Quarterly received responses from nine of these states. The judges from all
nine states would change venue to the jurisdiction where the juvenile resided. However,
the judges of six states added that they would allow a change of venue to the jurisdic-
tion where a serious or a non-serious anti-social act was committed.
28. Ky. REV. STAT. § 208.020 (1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.121 (1971).
The judge from Kentucky who responded did not answer this part of the question-
naire. The Minnesota judges indicated that a change of venue will usually be to the
court of the juvenile's residence.
29. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.69 (1969). Thus the proceedings can be transferred
to the county where the child is found, where the act occurred, or where the child
resides. The Iowa judges who responded to the questionnaire indicated that, despite
the broad language, transfers were actually made only to the residence of the child.
30. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 365 (1959); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169:3 (1955); N.Y.
FAMILY CT. AcT § 717 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
The judges of Alabama, Louisiana, and New York who responded all indicated that
a change of venue would occur primarily to the court of the juvenile's residence.
31. See note 26 supra.
32. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-70 (Supp. 1969); IowA CODE ANN. § 232.69
(1969); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:1570 (1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 155
(1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.121 (1971); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169:3 (1955);
N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 717 (McKinney Supp. 1972); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 419.545
& 419.547 (1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-85 (Supp. 1971); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-115.5 (Supp. 1971).
The Law Quarterly received responses from judges of eight states. As a general
rule, they indicated that in the majority (ranging from fifty to ninety-nine percent) of
the cases, venue was (in the order of frequency) changed at the (1) intake stage, (2)
after disposition, and (3) after adjudication but prior to disposition. Thus, despite the
absence of statutory guidance, the judges indicated a fairly uniform time period at
which a change of venue would occur.
33. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-5 (1964); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02 (Supp.
1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); KAN. Siwr, ANN.
413
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states permit a change of venue only after the transferring court has
determined that the juvenile court has jurisdiction.34
The decision to allow a change of venue is usually within the discre-
tion of the forum judge. Nine states provide for change of venue only
upon the court's motion.35 Four states allow the change to be made
on motion by any interested party or the court.3 6 Four states provide
for change of venue upon request from the juvenile court in the child's
residence.37  Of those four states, two make the change mandatory, 8
§ 38-212 (1964); Ky. Ruv. STAT. § 208.020 (1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-5
(Supp. 1971); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 26-7-1.1 (Supp. 1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33,
§ 636 (Supp. 1972).
The Lat Quarterly received responses from seven of these states. The judges of
five states indicated the percentage of changes of venue made at the intake stage: Kan-
sas, 80 percent; Illinois, 99 percent; Florida, 90 percent; Kentucky, 50 percent; and
South Dakota, 90 percent. The remaining cases were changed either after disposition
or after adjudication but prior to disposition.
34. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 365 (1959); CAL. WELF. & INSTN'S CODE § 750 (Deering
1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-212 (Supp. 1972).
The Law Quarterly received responses from all three states. As with the other two
types of statutes, see notes 32 and 33 supra, the broadness of the statute is narrowed in
actual practice.
35. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 365 (1959); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02 (Supp. 1972);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.69 (1969); KY. REV. STAT. § 208.020 (1971); ME. Rv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 155 (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.121 (1971); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 55-10-85 (Supp. 1971).
The Law Quarterly received responses from eight states. All the judges indicated
that in addition to the judge's own power to move for a change of venue, the juvenile,
his parents, or his attorney could also move for the change of venue. Judges from
two states also permitted change of venue on motion by the intake worker of the court.
In addition, all the judges except those from Maine reported that the most important
factor in making a change of venue decision was the residence of the child. Some
judges also considered the availability of greater intra-community rehabilitative re-
sources in the transferee jurisdiction.
36. COLO. REv. STAT. ANt. § 22-1-5 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-5 (Supp.
1971); Onio REv. CODE § 2151.27 (Supp. 1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 636 (Supp.
1972).
The Law Quarterly received responses from four states. Generally, it appears that
the court itself most often makes the motion to change venue; the juvenile, his parents,
or his attorney move for change of venue less frequently. All judges reported that
the-primary factor in the decision was the residence of the child. Some judges also
considered the availability of greater intracommunity rehabilitative resources in the
transferee jurisdiction.
37. CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 17-70 (Supp. 1969); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02 (Supp.
1972); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 419.545 & 419.547 (1971); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 26-7-
1.1 (Supp. 1972).
38. On. REV. STAT. §§ 419.545 & 419.547 (1969); S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 26-7-
1.1 (Supp. 1972).
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while the other two"9 place the decision at the discretion of the judge.4 °
Statutory standards for the exercise of this discretion include a show-
ing of "good cause," 4' 1 the "best interests of the child,"42 the "conven-
ience of the parties""3 and "the interests of justice."44
II. INFORMAL INTER-COUNTY TRANSFER AGREEMENTS
A. Treatment of non-resident juvenile offenders in the St. Louis Met-
ropolitan Area
An accurate picture of the functioning of statutory venue provisions
within the juvenile justice system cannot be obtained from an exami-
nation of the venue statutes themselves. In the first place, those stat-
utes are often too broadly drawn to give an accurate indication of the
venue of any particular juvenile court proceeding. When alternative
venues or changes of venue are permitted, it is impossible to predict
with assurance where a child's case will be handled. Secondly, the
statutes give no indication of the nature and extent of the discretion ex-
ercised by those administering the statute. The power to transfer cases
to other courts tends to make the setting of venue as much a matter
of administrative action as of legislative mandate. Therefore, the ne-
cessity of an examination of the everyday application of venue provisions
becomes apparent.
An examination of the implementation of Missouri's venue provision
has been made by the Law Quarterly, based upon an interview with the
regional coordinator of juvenile court services for the St. Louis metro-
politan area. The Missouri venue provision, as contained in the juris-
39. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-70 (Supp. 1969); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02 (Supp.
1972). See ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.545 & 419.547 (1969).
40. A change of venue provision was included in UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT
§ 12 (1968). This provision allowed a discretionary change to the child's residence
upon motion of the child or the court. The comment to this provision justified per-
mitting a change only to the child's residence on the basis that: (1) the county of resi-
dence has the primary duty of caring for and supervising the child; and (2) the resi-
dence has better access to the social history of the child.
41. See, e.g., N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 717 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
42. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 365 (1959); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-5
(1964); IowA CODE ANN. § 232.69 (1969); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 26-7-1.1 (Supp.
1972).
43. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 155 (1964); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 169:3 (1955).
44. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 155 (1964).
45. The St. Louis Metropolitan Region is a five county area with a total population
of 1.9 million. The counties involved are: St. Louis County, 951,000; St. Louis City,
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dictional grant, states that
the juvenile court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings:
(1) involving any child who may be within the county who is alleged
to be in need of care and treatment .... 41
While the language "who may be within the county" has been con-
strued by Missouri courts to require the physical presence of the child
within the county,4" it is still clear that a juvenile court could exercise
its jurisdiction over a child even if he neither committed any act within
the county nor resided there. Furthermore, the absence of any change of
venue provision would seem to indicate that any assumption of juris-
diction by a court would be final.
Juvenile court administrators in the St. Louis area do not operate un-
der that construction of the statute, however. Instead, they operate un-
der an agreement which, in effect, transforms the statute into a "venue
only in the residence" provision. The juvenile courts of four out of the
five counties comprising the St. Louis metropolitan area have joined
in a gentlemen's agreement governing the treatment of non-resident of-
fenders. Each participating juvenile court has agreed to transfer im-
mediately jurisdiction over non-resident youths to the juvenile court of
the child's residence when (1) the child resides in a county participating
in the agreement, and (2) the offense involved is not "serious" in na-
ture.
The agreement operates in the following manner.48 Upon identifi-
cation of a juvenile in custody as a non-resident, but yet a resident
of one of the participating counties, the intake department decides
whether jurisdiction over the child should be retained. The key factor
involved in this decision is the seriousness of the offense. If the par-
ticular offense involves bodily harm to others or significant property
loss, jurisdiction will be retained. If the offense is not deemed "serious,"
the police report and any other relevant information are forwarded to
the regional coordinator's office. The coordinator performs both a
screening and a routing function. As an aid he often checks with the
662,000; St. Charles County, 105,000; Jefferson County, 93,000; and Franklin County,
55,000.
46. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 211.031 (1969) (emphasis added).
47. In re Shaw, 449 S.W.2d 380 (Mo. App. 1969).
48. This information was obtained in an interview with Mr. Kenneth Foresman,
Coordinator of Juvenile Court Services, Region 5, Missouri Law Enforcement Assist-
ance Council, in St. Louis, Missouri, July 20, 1972. A transcript of the interview is
on file in the Washington University Law Library.
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arresting officer for additional information and with the juvenile court
of the child's residence for his prior record. When he has all the nec-
essary information before him, he determines whether there is both suffi-
cient evidence and reason to proceed with the case. Occasionally, he will
dismiss the charges himself, but in most cases dismissal will occur only
upon authorization of the referring court. If the coordinator decides
that no formal petition should be filed, he has three possible courses
of action available. He may send a letter concerning the incident to the
juvenile's residence court marked "for informational purposes only" to
be placed in the child's file. If the offense is a first offense and minor,
but requires some action, the coordinator may decide to have a confer-
ence with the parents or may send them a warning letter stating that any
further incidents would be referred to the juvenile court. If the case
is not screened out, the entire record is forwarded to the juvenile court
of the child's residence along with a transferal memorandum which
serves as formal authorization for the transfer. The receiving court
may then take any action that it deems appropriate.
During 1971, 1,110 "interjurisdictional referrals" passed through
the regional coordinator's office.4" While that figure indicates that the
agreement is being followed by the participating juvenile courts, its via-
bility was not always a foregone conclusion. When it was first initi-
ated, there were two basic concerns about the feasibility of the agree-
ment. The first concern was about the sheer volume of referrals. It
was clear from the beginning that the major flow of referrals would be
from the suburban counties into the City of St. Louis. In fact, ninety
percent of the interjurisdictional referrals in 1971 were referrals to the
St. Louis City Juvenile Court."' The city's participation in the agree-
ment was therefore crucial to its success. Judge Theodore McMillian,
St. Louis City Juvenile Court Judge, decided to accept the agreement
and assured the other counties that the city's intake staff would be able
to bear the burden of the anticipated referrals. His assessment has
proven correct. The second principal concern was that referrals would
not be acted upon by the receiving court. This, it was felt, would
merely encourage juveniles to confine their anti-social activity to the
counties surrounding their residence, since they would become aware
49. Missoum LAw ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE COUNCIL, REGION FivE, 1971 REPORT
ON THE COORDINATION OF JUVENILE COURT SERVICES-INTERJURISDICIONAL REIutAIs
6 [hereinafter cited as 1971 REPORT].
50. 1971 REPORT 6.
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that any referral to the residence would be of no consequence. Mr.
Kenneth Foresman, the present regional coordinator, conducted two
follow up surveys which indicated that this concern was unwarranted.
The first survey was of referrals made within a two month period, and
showed that every interjurisdictional referral had been acted upon in
some manner by the receiving court." The subsequent survey was
of referrals of juveniles who had committed two or more offenses
within the calendar year. The results indicated that less than ten per-
cent of the referrals had not been acted upon. 52
The policy determination that venue in the residence is preferable has
won overwhelming acceptance within the four participating counties.
An indication of this acceptance is the fact that jurisdiction over non-
residents has been retained in only five cases out of approximately
1,660 in a recent eighteen month period. 5" While the agreement gives
each participating court discretion to retain jurisdiction in any given
case, it is clear that they do not often exercise that discretion. Behind
this overwhelming acceptance of the agreement is the belief that the
residence court is the best court to handle juvenile offenders. This is
because the residence court, in most cases, is probably more knowl-
edgeable about the child's circumstances and background, 4 and is in
a better position to both arrive at and supervise the disposition of a case.
By uniformly channeling all handling of offenders to one court, that
court will develop a complete file on the child and therefore will be
better able to determine the most appropriate disposition. In many
cases this channeling feature serves as an early warning system, alerting
officials that the child is a "potential delinquent" and that immediate
action is required. A rather important aspect of this "one court" ap-
proach is its effect on the attitude of the court and the child. A court
51. Id. at 3-4.
52. Id. at 4-5.
53. Interview with Mr. Kenneth Foresman, supra note 48.
54. This enables the intake department to prepare a more thorough and accurate
social history, which most judges take into account in arriving at a disposition. The
following state statutes require the filing of such reports prior to disposition. ARu.
STAT. ANN. § 45-219 (1964); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-66 (1958); IoWA CODE ANN.
§ 232.14 (1969); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 57 (Supp. 1972); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 43-205.03 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.130 (1968); N.Y. FAMmY Cr. Acr § 727-734
(McKinney Supp. 1972); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-11 (1960); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-
1137 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-228 (Supp. 1972); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 13.04.040 (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-18 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.19
(1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14.115.28 (Supp. 1971).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss2/4
VENUE IN JUVENILE COURTS
which realizes that it will handle all future incidents in which the child
is involved will be encouraged to develop a more rational treatment
program-one which provides for adjustments for future behavioral
variations. Mr. Foresman believes that this continuity of handling has
also had a real deterrent effect on juvenile crime in the St. Louis area.
While the gentlemen's agreement clearly favors referral to the resi-
dence, there are situations which cannot easily be handled within its
framework. One special problem involves the question of the certifica-
tion of a child as an adult for trial in the criminal courts. Apparently,
the practice in the St. Louis area is that certification to be tried as an
adult can only be done by the juvenile court in the county where the
act which gives rise to the certification was committed. Thus, the re-
ceiving residence court will send the case back to the referring court
when certification as an adult is contemplated. This avoids a potential
constitutional difficulty; namely, whether a juvenile court other than
the juvenile court in the county where the act was committed can certify
a juvenile as an adult.
A second problem concerns the procedures for the physical transfer
of detained children. The problem is rare, since it is the practice of
the juvenile courts to release children directly to the custody of their
parents. However, when a parent cannot be reached or when the al-
leged act is serious, the child may be detained. Once detained, a juve-
nile will be transfered to the residence court under the authority of a
formal memorandum of transfer. The detained juvenile will then be
escorted back to the residence court by an intake worker of the resi-
dence court. Whether such a transfer constitutes an artificial and thus
impermissible creation of jurisdiction in the residence is a question which
the Missouri courts have not considered.5 When the jurisdiction of
the court depends on the physical presence of the child within the
county, it is questionable whether an act of the authorities may be the
basis for finding that physical presence.
A third problem concerns those incidents which involve a group of
juveniles, only some of whom reside in counties which participate in
the agreement. Mr. Foresman indicated that where the offense is not
serious the case is split and referred to each child's residence. If, how-
55. It is the recognized rule in civil cases that jurisdiction based on service of
process on a defendant who was brought within the jurisdiction fraudulently or other-
wise wrongfully is improper. Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1937); Bow-
man v. Neblett, 24 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. App. 1930).
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ever, one of the non-participating counties will not accept the case, the
referring court will reassume its jurisdiction over that particular child.
If the testimony of witnesses is essential, the court where the incident
occurred may retain jurisdiction over the whole case.
One side effect of the gentlemen's agreement has been the extension
of the operation of the agreement to residents of non-participating coun-
ties. The general practice is that any juvenile who commits an act
within the participating counties will be referred to his residence court re-
gardless of whether his residence county is one of the participating
counties. The same factors are taken into consideration and the same
procedures are followed as those employed for residents of the par-
ticipating counties. The only additional consideration is whether the
residence county will accept the referral. Franklin County, a county
adjacent to three of the participating counties, has taken the position that
the advantages of accepting such referrals do not outweigh the incon-
venience of requiring witnesses and arresting officers to travel great
distances to testify at hearings and adjudications. As a result it will
not accept or make any referrals. This decision may, in part, be due to
the fact that Franklin County is farther from the population center of
the metropolitan area than any of the other participating counties and
consequently has fewer problems with non-residents.
B. Treatment of non-resident juvenile offender in other states
The Law Quarterly mailed to juvenile judges throughout the country
a questionnaire which, in part, inquired about the existence and the
mechanics of any informal inter-county agreement to which they were
a party. The results of the questionnaire indicated that the St. Louis
area is not unique in its utilization of inter-county agreements for the
handling of non-resident juvenile offenders. Of the 112 judges in forty
states responding to the questionnaire, judges from nineteen stateso
acknowledged the existence of similar agreements in their area.
Twenty-one agreements5 7 restrict referral"' to the child's residence,
56. Arizona, California, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.
57. These twenty-one agreements were reported in cities in California, Delaware,
Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.
58. The terminology used in the questionnaire was actually "transfer," but since
both transfer and referral have the same meaning in the juvenile court context, the
terminology of the St. Louis juvenile courts is retained in this section.
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while five include the option of referral to the parents' residence if
different from that of the child. 9 Agreements from four states6"
allow referral either to the child's residence or to the county where the
act is alleged to have occurred, and three agreements in two states61
permit referral to either the child's residence, the parents' residence, or
the county where the acts are alleged to have occurred. Only two agree-
ments limit referrals to the county where the acts are alleged to have oc-
curred."
On the whole, then, these agreements, like the St. Louis area agree-
ment. are designed to provide for the referral of cases involving non-resi-
dents to the juvenile court of the juvenile's residence. The replies to the
questionnaire also established that under the terms of the agreements
each juvenile court has the power to retain jurisdiction over a case in
certain situations. 3 The agreements are clearly informal and not bind-
ing on the courts. As in St. Louis, the most important factor in a de-
cision not to make a referral is whether the offense alleged is "serious." 64
The replies from seven states ' , which listed this as a factor did not elab-
orate which offenses would be classified as "serious," although one spe-
cified felonies," ' and another capital offenses. 7 Two judges stated that
a referral would be made if certification as an adult was contemplated. 8
Other factors which were listed included whether two or more youths
were involved, ' whether an adult was involved,70 and whether the
59. Such agreements were reported to exist in California, Michigan, Ohio, Oregon.
and Pennsylvania.
60. Arizona, Iowa, Michigan, and Pennsylvania.
6 1. Two of the three agreements are in California and the other is in Nevada.
62. These two agreements are in New York and Ohio.
63. Only a juvenile judge from South Carolina stated that he had no discretion
to retain jurisdiction.
64. While there is no clear distinction between serious and non-serious crimes,
serious crimes are generally considered by the judges to be those which involve violence
or the threat of violence.
65. Arizona, Delaware, Iowa, Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
66. Response from a judge in Wisconsin.
67. Response from a judge in Pennsylvania.
68, Judges in Iowa and Michigan. One Iowa judge stated:
Iowa's juvenile statutes clearly indicate a preference for handling the child in
his own home insofar as possible. Normally, a nonresident juvenile offender
will be released to juvenile authorities of the county or state where he resides.
The only exception is in that situation where consideration is given to trying
the offender as an adult, such as in crimes of violence.
69. Response from a judge in New Jersey. Another judge from New Jersey stated
that: "If the jurisdiction of residence requests that we retain jurisdiction -in a complex
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child objected to the transfer. 71  Most of the referrals are made at in-
take. Twenty-one of the responses indicated that over ninety percent
of their referrals are made at intake.72 Nine courts,73 however, prefer
to wait until a finding of facts has been made before transferring. Even
in states where most transfers are made at intake, an exception is often
made for contested cases.7 4 In California, for example, one response
indicated that if there is a factual dispute, transfer to the residence is
not made until a finding of fact is made by the court as to where the act
occurred.
The judges gave varied explanations for why they participate in such
agreements. Some 75 stated that the agreements are simply effective
and efficient methods of dealing with non-resident juvenile offenders.
Others76 claim that transfers to the residence lead to better dispositions
and better supervision of offenders. For others, participation was the
result of a strong Juvenile Judge Association 77 or a history of coopera-
tion between intake or probation departments. 78  The most frequently
stated reason for preferring residence venue was that it allowed the
residence court to develop a more complete understanding of the child
putting it in a better position to select and supervise a disposition. 79
matter involving many local witnesses and other local juveniles, [the court would retain
jurisdiction] to avoid duplicitious [sic] hearings and a burden on witnesses."
70. Response from a judge in Pennsylvania.
71. Response from a judge in California.
72. Judges indicating this situation were from: California (2); Illinois; Iowa (3);
Louisiana; Michigan (3); Minnesota; Nevada; New Jersey (2); Ohio (2)" Oregon;
Pennsylvania; South Carolina (2); and South Dakota.
73. Courts in California (2), Delaware (2), New York (2), North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Wisconsin. A response from New York City indicates that referrals
to the residence are frequently made for the dispositional phase of New York's two-
phase proceeding if the juvenile resides in one of New York City's five counties.
74. Contested cases are cases in which the juvenile disputes the facts alleged in the
petition charging delinquency.
75. Judges in Michigan, Nevada, and Tennessee.
76. Judges in California, Iowa, and Pennsylvania.
77. Response from a judge in Minnesota. A judge in New Jersey observed that
"participation was the result of improved public relations."
78. Response from a judge in California.
79. Responses from judges in Iowa, Michigan, New Jersey, Oregon, and Penn-
sylvania. The comments of a New Jersey judge were:
We believe that except in serious charges or those involving multiple offenders
particularly where a formal trial is necessary, the county of residence has the
greatest interest in the handling of the matter and for practical reasons, in-
cluding closer contact with school administrators. Also, if the child has been
known to the court, the county of residence would have appropriate informa-
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It was also pointed out that a residence court had easier access to so-
ciological and background information on the child. 0 Other judges
emphasized the fact that a residence court usually has a greater interest
in the child," l is more aware of community resources,8 2 and can con-
duct family counseling more effectively.8 3
III. COMMISSION VENUE OR RESIDENCE VENUE AS A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
Although no case has been found declaring a particular form of
venue for juvenile proceedings to be constitutionally required, argu-
ments can be formulated to support the proposition that either commis-
sion venue"' or residence venue 5 is a constitutional requisite.
The argument supporting a constitutional right to commission venue
is based on the "substantial fairness" test of the due process clause.8 6
tion for disposition. We, in New Jersey, utilize a postponement of adjudica-
tion often, particularly in minor offenses, and thus avoid imposing a juvenile
record [on the youth]. This can be best determined by the county of resi-
dence.
80. Response from a judge in South Carolina, who stated: "Even if the court
where the juvenile resides does not have a record on him, they would have easier access
to his family, school and others who could provide more social background on the
child."
81. Responses from judges in Illinois and New Jersey.
82. Responses from judges in Michigan (2), New Jersey (2), and Oregon. The
Oregon judge included the juvenile's relatives as being a valuable source of community
assets for rehabilitation.
83. Response from a judge in Minnesota, who explained that his preference for
residence venue was based on a belief that "family counselling and treatment services
for the juvenile in his own environment" are better.
84. Commission venue refers to holding the stages of the juvenile justice system
in the juvenile justice system in the county or district in which the alleged violation
occurred.
85. Residence venue refers to holding these stages in the county or district in
which the juvenile resides.
86. The right to commission venue in all criminal prosecutions is protected by the
sixth amendment, which provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law ...
U.S. CONsT. amend. VI (emphasis added). Any argument based on the sixth amend-
ment and its incorporation under the fourteenth amendment would necessarily first have
to answer whether the adjudication stage of a juvenile proceeding is a "criminal prosecu-
tion" within the meaning of the sixth amendment. This is a question which the Su-
preme Court has studiously avoided answering because the Court fears that any such
holding would introduce unnecessary rigidity into the various state approaches to the
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In re Gault 7 held that certain procedural protections were constitu-
tionally required by the due process clause during the adjudication
stage of juvenile proceedings in order to insure the substantial fairness
of the proceedings. These protections include the right to be repre-
sented by counsel, the right to confrontation and cross-examination
and the privilege against self-incrimination. In McKeiver v. Pennsyl-
vania,88 however, the Court, characterizing the protections held appli-
cable to juvenile proceedings in Gault as those designed to insure ac-
curate fact-finding, stated that the jury was not essential to reliable and
accurate fact-finding and therefore held that the constitutional right to
a jury trial did not extend to juvenile proceedings. Thus, for any addi-
tional rights to be held applicable to the adjudication stage of a juve-
nile proceeding it would now seem that the rights must be an aid to
accurate fact-finding. Commission venue, it can be argued, is such an
aid because it would promote convenience for the witnesses and fur-
ther the ease of investigation by providing a ready access to the physical
evidence of the case. 9
The possible argument for the proposition that residence venue is con-
stitutionally required is based upon the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. The proposition is that, since juveniles receive
fewer procedural safeguards than adults in criminal proceedings, they
should receive other benefits in exchange; namely, residence venue.90
The benefits accruing to the juvenile, as explained by the judges re-
juvenile justice system. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
In the case of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Supreme Court was presented
with the issue that, since the juvenile proceeding is civil in nature rather than criminal,
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination could not be held applicable
because the fifth amendment specifically states that it applies in a "criminal case."
The Court, in response, stated that to so hold "would be to disregard substance because
of the feeble enticement of the 'civil' label-of-convenience which has been attached to
juvenile proceedings." 387 U.S. at 49. The Court preferred, instead, to judge whether
the proceeding was criminal with respect to the right asserted rather than to engage
in a labeling game. The Court thus evinced a willingness to declare the juvenile pro-
ceeding as "criminal" only for the purposes of providing particular safeguards. At
least two members of the present Supreme Court, however, are willing to have the
sixth amendment apply to all juvenile proceedings when the act alleged is a violation of
a criminal statute and the child faces a period of confinement if adjudged a delinquent.
See Mr. Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 557.
87. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
88. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
89. Judges emphasizing this point were from numerous states, including California,
Delaware, Florida, Iowa, New York, and South Carolina.
90. Cf. In re Rich, 125 Vt. 373, 216 A.2d 266 (1966).
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sponding to the questionnaire, would be a more appropriate disposition
because of a more complete knowledge of the juvenile's background
and his particular problems and needs. This enables the judge to
make a more informal and better use of the available rehabilitative re-
sources, and thus advance the treatment objective of the juvenile justice
system. 1
Before a new constitutional right is established, however, its probable
impact upon the system ought to be assessed. In this area, even assum-
ing the constitutional arguments are tenable, neither proposition should
be accepted. If commission venue was established as a constitutional
right, it would advance the juvenile system through improvement of
the adjudication stage by assuring accurate and adequate fact-finding.
Commission venue as a constitutional right would not promote the ob-
jective underlying the disposition stage, however, since the available
evidence indicates that the court sitting where the act occurred does not
have available to it the full information needed to make an informal
use of dispositional facilities unless it is also the court of the juvenile's
residence.", Conversely, residence venue as a constitutional right would
function well at the disposition stage to advance the ideal of rehabilita-
tion :" but the consensus of the judges responding to the questionnaire
was that the court of the juvenile's residence cannot perform the ad-
judication function of fact-finding as well as the court where the alleged
anti-social act was committed.
It is apparent that to adjudicate either commission venue or residence
venue as a constitutional right will introduce an aspect of inflexibility
into the juvenile court process which will defeat the purposes of the ju-
venile process in at least some instances: commission venue as a con-
stitutional right will weaken the dispositional process, while residence
venue as a constitutional right will undermine possible constitutional
rights to accurate fact-finding. Further, the adjudication of such a
constitutional right to a certain venue would render the flexible and in-
formal gentlemen's agreements among juvenile courts in a metropolitan
area unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
One basis for juvenile venue might be the following proposed statute:
91. See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra.
92. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
93. See Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HAv. L. REiv. 104 (1909).
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Venue in all delinquency proceedings shall lie in the jurisdiction where
the juvenile resides; provided, that venue shall lie in the jurisdiction
where the alleged delinquency occurred if requested by the juvenile,
his attorney, or his parent or guardian; provided further, that if the
adjudication takes place in the jurisdiction where the alleged delinquency
occurred and the juvenile is adjudicated delinquent, the case shall be
transferred for disposition to the jurisdiction where the juvenile resides.
The proposed statute initially and primarily provides for residence
venue. This is based on the value judgment that the juvenile process
will be best served by facilitating the dispositional process of the ju-
venile courts. The judges responding to the questionnaire seemed to
agree that residence venue best allows a juvenile court to intelligently
provide for the disposition of the offending juvenile. The statute does,
however, allow alternative venue in the jurisdiction where the alleged
act occurred if requested. This provision is a frank recognition that
the possibility exists that courts might find that a constitutional right
to accurate fact-finding cannot be satisfied without commission venue.
It is probably indefensible to limit the opportunity for commission
venue only to serious crimes, for the juvenile charged with a less grave
anti-social act has the same interest in accurate fact-finding on the issue
of his guilt or innocence as the juvenile charged with an act com-
parable to a felony. Note that the statute provides for disposition in
the jurisdiction where the juvenile resides, regardless of where the
adjudication process takes place. Thus the preference for disposition
in the juvenile's residence is maintained.
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